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The relationship between decadence and aesthetics is an intimate and complex one. Both the 
stock figure of the aesthete and the aestheticism of ‘art for art’s sake’ are classic decadent 
tropes with obvious sources in figures such as Théophile Gautier, Walter Pater, Joris-
Karl Huysmans. Yet the links between aesthetics and decadence are more conflicted than 
might first appear: historically, aesthetics has served both as a site for the theorisation of 
decadence and as the basis of an attempt to stem it. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
these intricate ties. 
I will begin from Kant’s formulation of the aesthetic space, a formulation which, 
whether evaluated positively or negatively, came to dominate the modern discussion. I then 
examine the effects of Kant’s legacy on writers such as Gautier and Pater, before turning to 
the philosopher who placed perhaps the greatest emphasis on decadence and on the 
importance of art in responding to it: Friedrich Nietzsche. I conclude by sketching some 
possible lines for further development, lines running though Heidegger, Adorno and Bataille. 
 
(§1) Kant and Modern Aesthetics 
Nietzsche once mocked Kantian aesthetics for manifesting the “naïveté of a country parson” 
and Kant’s foundational role in the theorisation of decadence is, unsurprisingly, a largely 
unintentional one (Nietzsche 1994: Essay 3/§6).  
Kant’s writings certainly contain a recognisable model of decadence, embedded 
within worries about conflicts between theoretical and practical, i.e. moral, reason. The 
danger, as Kant saw it, was that our intelligence extends and incite desires beyond their 
natural limits, particularly through acts of comparison (Kant 1991:223-4). Operating in a 
clearly Rousseauian vein, Kant notes that modern civilization exacerbates this trend, allowing 
a ceaseless, artificial multiplication of wants: this reaches its peak in the demand for “luxury” 
[Üppigkeit], a demand that can never be stably satisfied (Kant 2011:96,117-8). This threat is 
characterised by Kant in terms familiar from the later rhetoric of decadence: luxury produces 
“effeminacy, our delicacy of senses” (Kant 2011:150) The immediate solution he offers is a 
form of asceticism: it would be better “to get free of inclinations and to learn how to do 
without them” (Kant 2011:118).  
 These remarks on decadence, whilst important for mapping Kant’s debts to Rousseau, 
are not, however, his principal contribution to that concept’s development. That lies rather 
with his theory of aesthetics. Kant’s use of the term “aesthetics” simultaneously builds on and 
utterly radicalises earlier work by the neo-Leibnizians Alexander Baumgarten and Georg 
Friedrich Meier. Baumgarten understood “aesthetics” as both the “science of sensitive 
cognition [scientia cognitionis sensitivae]” and the “science of the beautiful [Wissenschaft 
des Schönen] (Baumgarten 1986:§1; Baumgarten and Meier 2013:§533).1 For Kant the 
relationship between these two definitions was a delicate one. Indeed, the first Critique 
explicitly takes Baumgarten to task for using the term to “designate that which others call the 
critique of taste”: his objection, at that point in time, was that there are no a priori rules 
                                                
1 The second remark is Meier’s German reformulation of Baumgarten’s Latin; the exact relationship between 
the two authors is contested, but for present purposes we can treat them as one. 
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governing beauty and thus no possible science of “aesthetics” (Kant 1998:A21/B35-6). Kant 
therefore initially reserves the term for the a priori study of sensibility, and it is in this context 
that the first Critique introduces the anti-rationalist “Transcendental Aesthetic” (Kant 
1998:A21/B36). By the time of the Critique of Judgment in 1790, however, Kant had 
reversed course and was now willing to use “aesthetics” in something very close to the 
second Baumgarten/Meier definition, to designate the analysis of taste and beauty. It is 
“Kantian aesthetics” in this sense which is important in the present context. 
  Fundamental to Kant’s aesthetics is an attempt to separate judgments of taste from 
other forms of judgment; following him, I will focus on the case of beauty. First, judgments 
of beauty are neither objective nor cognitive: to say that an object is beautiful is not to 
attribute a property to it, but rather to articulate something of my reaction upon 
encountering.2 Such judgments thus: 
[G]o beyond the concept of the object, and even beyond the intuition of 
the object, and add…a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). (Kant 1987:288)3 
Second, judgements of beauty differ from both instrumental and moral assertions, understood 
by Kant as claims that something is good for some end or that it is good in itself. This is 
because a predication of beauty, unlike these other two, requires no concept: 
To deem something good, I must always know what sort of a thing the object 
is intended to be, i. e., I must have a concept of it. That is not necessary to enable me 
to see beauty in a thing. Flowers, free patterns, lines aimlessly intertwining 
technically termed foliage, have no signification, depend upon no definite concept, 
and yet please. (Kant 1987:207) 
Third, judgements of beauty are distinguished from judgements based on desire or interest, 
judgments that I “like” something, that it “gratifies” me, that it is “agreeable” (Kant 
1987:205-7). Kant draws this boundary in several ways, but what is clear is his aim in doing 
so: such judgements lack any claim to universality, since there is no reason that what pleases 
me should do the same for you. 
As regards the agreeable [des Angenehmen] everyone acknowledges that his 
judgment, which he bases on a private feeling and by which he says that he likes 
some object, is by the same token confined to his own person. Hence, if he says that 
canary wine is agreeable he is quite content if someone else corrects his terms and 
reminds him to say instead: It is agreeable to me. (Kant 1987:212) 
In contrast, judgments of taste have an “aesthetic-universal validity, which does not rest on a 
concept”: in asserting that something is beautiful, I demand that others ought to agree with 
me (Kant 1987:214;237). One of Kant’s great challenges will be to explicate how such 
“subjective universality” is possible: if a claim is neither factual nor moral nor conceptual, 
how can it demand assent from others? (Kant 1987:214). In doing so, he appeals centrally to 
what he calls the “free play” of imagination and understanding, the pleasurable reaction we 
experience as our faculties respond to the way in which beauty eludes standard conceptual 
classification (Kant 1987:240). In Kantian terms, beauty thus correlates with a particular form 
of “synthesis”, of mental combination. 
 
 
 
                                                
2 The underlying metaphysics here are delicate. It is clear how Kant understands the contrast between judgments 
of taste and ascriptions of primary qualities such as extension; it is much less clear how judgements of taste 
differ from, say, colour ascriptions and their objectivity or lack of it. A closely linked issue arises with respect to 
nonconceptualism: the one hand, he declares that “beauty is not a concept of the object” (Kant 1987:290); on the 
other he states that it is “indeterminate concept” (Kant 1987:341).  
3 I use the standard Akademie pagination for this text. 
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(§2) Kant Among the Decadents 
 
Kant’s analysis is without doubt the dominant moment in modern aesthetics. It is also, much 
more specifically, one of the key texts in understanding the view that become known as 
“aestheticism”. a theory whose development was closely aligned with decadence by 
opponents and supporters. This is not to deny that individual supporters of aestheticism might 
reject either or both the term “decadence” or the views associated with it; to take a recent 
example, Gagnier seeks to distinguish and valorise Victorian “aesthetes” (including Ruskin, 
Morris, and Wilde) precisely by contrasting them with mere “decadents” (Gagnier 1994:265). 
My point is rather that aestheticism created the intellectual space for decadence as a concept 
to develop – as we will now see, it was an intellectual space whose architecture was 
remarkably Kantian. 
First, and most obviously, Kant’s view licenses a separation of art from utilitarian or 
didactic concerns. The Kantian aesthetic defines a distinctive zone of pleasure lacking any 
external purpose: in Kant’s terms, beauty is defined by “purposiveness” in the absence of any 
particular purpose (Kant 1987:221). There is a clear resonance between this view and the 
aestheticist doctrine that art is not properly subject to moral or instrumental evaluation. 
Indeed, it its strongest form, aestheticism treats moral appraisal as radically inappropriate, 
akin a category mistake such as asking the colour of the number six: as Wilde put it, “[t]here 
is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book” (Wilde 2006:36). Similar thoughts underlie 
Gautier’s attack on the idea that art should serve some kind of social purpose. 
Nothing is really beautiful unless it is useless; everything useful is ugly, for it 
expresses a need, and the needs of man are ignoble and disgusting, like his poor weak 
nature. The most useful place in a house is the toilet. (Gautier 1981:39)  
Sloganized, such aestheticism yields the familiar rallying cry of “art for art’s sake”. As 
Armstrong neatly put it, Gautier’s thus position amounted to a “perverse twist on the Kantian 
notion of the autonomy of the beautiful” (Armstrong 2002:402).  
Second, Kant’s system embeds taste and beauty within a story revolving around our 
reactions to objects and our awareness of ourselves as sites of a distinctive form of pleasure, a 
distinctive form of synthesis irreducible to the conceptual. This strand of Kantianism is 
clearly visible in thinkers such as Pater: as Prettejohn observes, it is thus vital to see Pater’s 
work as supported “not casually but rigorously by the German tradition of philosophical 
aesthetics that proceeded from Kant’s Critique of Judgment” (Prettejohn 2007:3). It is thus 
natural for Pater to begin his Renaissance by privileging the following questions about art: 
What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book, to 
me? What effect does it really produce on me? Does it give me pleasure? and if so, 
what sort or degree of pleasure? How is my nature modified by its presence, and 
under its influence? (Pater 1997: xviii) 
The infamous conclusion to that text likewise showcases the emphasis on synthesis 
characteristic of Kant’s account: objects are “loosed into a group of impressions— colour, 
odour, texture - in the mind of the observer” (Pater 1997:119). The result is a system that 
combines aestheticism with an emphasis on the fragmentary experience of pleasure through a 
combination that is neither fully free, nor fully determined, that is “playful” in Kant’s terms. 
Similar themes are visible in Wilde when he has Vivian make a deeply Kantian sounding 
appeal to: 
[T]he aesthetic sense alone, which, while accepting both reason and 
recognition as stages of apprehension, subordinates them both to a 
pure synthetic impression of the work of art as a whole. (Wilde 2001:242). 
Indeed, Benjamin Morgan recently suggested that: 
Penultimate Draft - Please Cite the Published Version 
https://kcl.academia.edu/SachaGolob 
4	
	
Perhaps what is aesthetic about aestheticism is not just its obsession with ‘convulsed 
sensuousness’ or purified ideals, but rather its recognition that physical beauty 
dramatizes the dilemma of the modern subject who is immersed in the material 
world, but striving to be free of material contingency. (Morgan 2010:749) 
Kant’s free play of the imagination, an escape from logical stricture, but one necessarily 
grounded in a dynamic response to sensory input, provides a natural model for such a 
thought. 
Kantian aesthetics thus provides some of the central intellectual architecture for 
aestheticism and so for the theorisation of decadence. But I described Kant’s links to 
decadence as ironic and it is also vital to appreciate just how far removed someone like Pater 
was from Kant’s own position. This distance holds even outside the obvious questions of 
hedonism and morality. As Hext neatly observes, Pater “valued Kant as a sceptic” (Hext 
2013:55). The result is that his understanding of the texts is frequently staggeringly 
unorthodox. For example, his “Prosper Mérimée” declares that: 
After Kant’s criticism of mind, its pretensions to pass beyond the limits of individual 
experience seemed as dead as those of old French royalty. (Pater 1910:1)4 
This fits exactly with the solipsism Pater toys with in the Conclusion to his Renaissance. But 
it is an extraordinary reading of a philosopher whose every effort was dedicated to seeking 
universal forms of experience – be they the first Critique’s categories of the understanding or 
the third’s “sensus communis” (Kant 1987:238). But by far the most important distortion 
concerns the relationship between aesthetics and morality. Whilst Kant did indeed seek to 
distinguish the beautiful from the moral, he also envisaged a vast web of incentives and 
intimations linking the two. Most obviously, he holds that the divide between beauty and 
desire allows the beautiful to prepare us for the moral obligation to set aside our mere 
interest: as he puts “the beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without 
interest” (Kant 1987:267). The converse also holds: developing and reflecting on moral ideas 
is the “true propaedeutic” for taste (Kant 1987:356). To put the point another way, Kant’s 
“purposiveness without a purpose” is very far removed from Gautier’s “uselessness”: for 
Kant, the awareness of beauty suggests, albeit without proof, that the world is essentially 
hospitable to us and to the realisation of an aim “independent of all interest”, namely morality 
(Kant 1987:167).  
Perhaps the deepest explanation for these divergences is as follows. The third Critique 
sought to unify the various parts of Kant’s system. This unification was widely assumed to be 
a failure by Kant’s successors and, as a result, the carefully calibrated links which Kant had 
envisaged between domains such as the beautiful and the moral fall. What succeeded them 
was either the type of full-blown unificatory project beloved of German Idealism on the one 
hand, or the blunter distinction between aesthetics and morality found in aestheticism on the 
other. In this sense, what decadence thrives off is not so much Kant’s project, but, fittingly, 
its corpse. 
 
(§3) Nietzsche and the “Decadence Problem” 
I want now to turn to Nietzsche. Nietzsche plays several roles in what one might call the 
“genealogy of modern decadence”. He was accused by Max Nordau in his 1892 
Degeneration, of supplying its theoretical underpinnings: 
The deification of filth by the Parnassians with ink, paint, and clay; the censing 
among the Diabolists and Decadents of licentiousness, disease, and corruption; the 
glorification, by Ibsen, of the person who ‘wills,’ is ‘free’ and ‘wholly himself’ - of all 
                                                
4 I owe the citation to Hext's excellent treatment of Pater’s philosophy of mind (Hext 2013:55). 
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this Nietzsche supplies the theory, or something which proclaims itself as such. 
(Nordau 1895:415-6) 
Nordau is cautious about positing an actual line of influence, not least due to some obvious 
issues of chronology, but he opts instead for a diagnosis on which Nietzsche exemplifies a 
deep, common malady. 
At the same time, it is unquestionable that Nietzsche could not have known the 
French Decadents and English aesthetes whom he so frequently approaches, because 
his books are in part antecedent to those of the latter; and neither could they have 
drawn from him, because, perhaps with the exception of Ibsen, it is only about two 
years since they could have heard as much as Nietzsche’s name. The similarity, or 
rather identity, is not explained by plagiarism; it is explained by the identity of mental 
qualities in Nietzsche and the other ego-maniacal degenerates. (Nordau 1895:416) 
This is followed by a laughably crude survey of Nietzsche’s ideas, glued together by 
Nordau’s trademark bluster: Nietzsche is “a madman, with flashing eyes, wild gestures, and 
foaming mouth” who “has not thought out one of his so-called ideas” (Nordau 1895:416). 
Nietzsche’s role in Nordau’s text is of interest because it exemplifies the close linkage 
between cultural decadence and biological degeneration defended there: Nietzsche, the mad 
invalid, is the poster boy of a broader, social sickness. But it is, unsurprisingly, Nietzsche’s 
own treatment of decadence that has been of far greater philosophical and cultural import, 
and it is that on which I will now focus. 
 Decadence, typically in the French spelling “décadence”, is one of the central targets 
throughout Nietzsche’s work: as he put it himself, “nothing has preoccupied me more 
profoundly than the problem of decadence” [das Problem der décadence] (Nietzsche 
2010c:233). In particular, he saw himself as potential turning point, both the scion of a 
decadent culture and an alternative to it, someone who “knows both” because “I am both…at 
the same time decadent and beginning” (Nietzsche 2010a:75). He continues: 
My task, preparing for humanity's moment of highest self-examination, a great noon 
when it will look back and look out, when it will escape from the domination of 
chance and priests and, for the first time, pose the question ‘why?’, the question ‘what 
for?’ as a whole -, this task follows necessarily from the insight that humanity has not 
put itself on the correct path, that it has absolutely no divine governance, that instead, 
the instinct of negation, of corruption, the decadence-instinct [décadence-Instinkt], 
has been seductively at work, and precisely under humanity's holiest value concepts. 
(Nietzsche 2010a:121) 
As is suggested here, Nietzsche fundamentally understands decadence in terms of life-denial: 
The wisest men in every age have reached the same conclusion about life: it’s no 
good…Always and everywhere, you hear the same sound from their mouths, - a 
sound full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of exhaustion with life, full of resistance 
to life. Even Socrates said as he died: ‘living that means being sick for a long time: I 
owe Asclepius the Saviour a rooster’....What does this prove? What does it 
demonstrate?... ‘There has to be some sickness here’ - is what we will reply: these 
wisest men of all ages, let us start looking at them more closely! Perhaps they had 
become a bit unsteady on their feet? Perhaps they were late? doddering? decadent? 
(Nietzsche 2010d:162) 
As Silk summarises, “[f]or Nietzsche, decadence is any kind of saying no to life” (Silk 
2004:594). We will now see how Nietzsche undertook to map this threat in immense detail in 
both Greek and Christian culture. 
I will take the Greek case first. For Nietzsche, the key here is Socrates: both Socratic 
rationalism and the disdain for life the philosopher exhibited by his final words are seen by 
Nietzsche as symptomatic of a “declining, weary” instinct (Nietzsche 2010d:162).  
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My readers perhaps know to what extent I regard dialectic as a symptom of decadence 
[Décadence-Symptom], in the most famous case of all, for example: the case of 
Socrates. (Nietzsche 2010a:75) 
The first accusation here is that Socratic dialectic arose out of an inability to embrace and 
tolerate the tragic nature of life, instead seeking refuge in an illusion of control on which 
virtue and knowledge and happiness neatly aligned: 
Conversely, those things which gave rise to the death of tragedy - Socratism in ethics, 
the dialectics, smugness and cheerfulness of theoretical man - might not this very 
Socratism be a sign of decline, of exhaustion, of sickness, of the anarchic dissolution 
of the instincts?...For the virtuous hero must now be a dialectician; there must now be 
a necessary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality. 
(Nietzsche 1999:70) 
Platonic idealism provides the metaphysical accompaniment to this weakness, by sanctifying 
another world sanitised of the imperfections of this one: Socrates and Plato are thus “agents 
of Greek disintegration” (Nietzsche 2010d:162).5 A second charge is that Socratic methods 
allowed “the rabble”, particularly those unable or unwilling to engage in open combat, to 
subvert and ultimately “humiliate” a noble culture, one in which “nothing with real value 
needs to be proved first” (Nietzsche 2010d:164). Socratic rationalism is thus a human all too 
human power play, a triumph of one set of instincts over another, a victory for “plebeian 
ressentiment” (Nietzsche 2010d:164). 
 The advance of decadence is famously cemented for Nietzsche with the coming of 
Christianity. 
From the very outset, Christianity was essentially and pervasively the feeling of 
disgust and weariness which life felt for life. (Nietzsche 1999:9) 
Christ is thus ‘this most interesting decadent” (Nietzsche 2010b:28) and the task of the priest 
is to cultivate these nea-saying, anti-life instincts (Nietzsche 2010a:122) – for example, 
through shepherding the slave revolt chronicled in the Genealogy of Morality . One sees here 
a central aspect of Nietzsche’s model of decadence: it identifies an unavoidable set of 
instincts - weariness, ressentiment, weakness - which are present in all cultures and yet which 
have come to dominate in some.  
Decadence belongs to all epochs of mankind… 
Decadence itself is nothing to fight against. It is absolutely necessary, and belongs 
to every age and every people. What should be fought with all one’s might is the 
creeping contagion of the healthy parts of the organism…(Nietzsche 1968:§339) 
Silk elegantly summarises: 
For Nietzsche, decadence exists in any age, but in the modern age it is dominant, and 
in the modern age, accordingly, any positive move must involve constructive 
confrontation with it. (Silk 2004:595) 
 
(§4) Nietzsche: Aesthetics and The Response to Decadence  
How is such a “constructive confrontation” to occur? Nietzsche employs a huge range of 
tools, from genealogy to the deliberate creation of new values, in his attempts to reverse the 
                                                
5 Depending on the context, Nietzsche alternately emphasises Socrates’s agency in bringing about this 
degeneration or his status as a symptom of an already ongoing decline. For example, in the early period, Birth of 
Tragedy commends Aristophanes for “scenting the characteristics of a degenerate culture” in Socrates, 
Euripides and “the music of the new exponents of the dithyramb” (Nietzsche 1999:122). Similarly, Twilight of 
the Idols describes Socrates as recognising his own decadence as mirrored in society at large: 
[H] understood that his case, his idiosyncrasy of a case was not an exception any more. The same type 
of degeneration was quietly gaining ground everywhere: old Athens was coming to an end. (Nietzsche 
2010d:165) 
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dominance of decadence. But the one I want to focus on in the present context is art, 
particularly art understood within a broadly aesthetic framework. 
 There are two examples that are particularly important here. The first is the appeal in 
Birth of Tragedy to Greek theatre and ultimately to the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk as a 
means of combatting decadence. Nietzsche frames his project as an exercise in “the science 
of aesthetics” and it promises to offer an “aesthetic” justification for life, a way of reconciling 
ourselves to it and embracing it, rather than distorting and denying it as Socratic tradition 
supposedly does (Nietzsche 1999:14). 
Our highest dignity lies in our significance as works of art - for only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified. (Nietzsche 1999:33) 
The details of Nietzsche's original argument here are deeply interwoven with a 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics that he later came to satirise for treating music as a “telephone 
to the beyond” (Nietzsche 1994:3/5). But what is vital for current purposes is that art, once 
one has grasped its twin Apolline and Dionysiac aspects, is the key means to reversing the 
decline instituted by Socrates and allowing a justification of the world that avoids his 
rationalism. 
 The second and related case is Nietzsche’s later emphasis on self-creation: by this 
point, aesthetic justification is no longer a matter of music or theatre specifically but of a 
broader self-stylisation. 
As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes us 
with the eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves 
into such a phenomenon. (Nietzsche 2001:§107) 
This project is framed in terms that would have been eminently recognisable to aesthetes in 
both London and Paris: we must become “poets of our life’ (Nietzsche 2001:§299). Again, art 
is key vehicle for escaping decadence, although it is also a risky one. There is always a 
danger that: 
The ceaseless desire to create on the part of the artist, together with his ceaseless 
observation of the world outside him, prevent him from becoming better and more 
beautiful as a person, that is to say from creating himself. (Nietzsche 1996:236) 
There is a highly aestheticist ring to this. Yet it is vital to see that Nietzsche cannot subscribe 
to slogans of ‘art for art’s sake’: the cultural mission he ascribes to art is too important to 
allow that: its task is to recreate a 'yea-saying' culture in the face of Socratic and Christian 
denial. 
Art is the great stimulus to life: how could it be thought purposeless, aimless, l’art 
pour l’art? (Nietzsche 2010d:204) 
So far, I have presented a relatively simple model of the relationship between 
aesthetics and decadence in Nietzsche: crudely, the former is a potential mechanism for 
fighting the latter. Yet, as throughout his work, Nietzsche’s full position is both more 
conflicted and more interesting than such a summary would suggest. The best way to see that 
is to examine the man he came to call “a model decadent”, the man who “has made music 
sick” - Wagner (Nietzsche 2010c:240). 
 
(§5) Nietzsche, Wagner and The Ambiguous Status of Art 
In the Birth of Tragedy, Wagner was, as sketched above, very much part of the solution. By 
The Case of Wagner in 1888, Nietzsche had come to see him as the highpoint of 
contemporary decadence; we will see, this shift also illustrates the multi-faceted nature of that 
concept for Nietzsche.  
Nietzsche sees Wagner as gradually aligning himself with precisely the decadent life-
denial found in Christianity. Parsifal is the most obvious case, and the degeneration on show 
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there is considered so extreme by Nietzsche that he toys with the idea of its being deliberately 
ironic: 
We might be tempted to assume…even to wish that Wagner’s Parsifal was meant to 
be funny, like an epilogue, or satyr play with which the tragedian Wagner wanted to 
take leave of us, of himself and above all of tragedy in a manner fitting and worthy of 
himself, namely by indulging in an excessive bout of the most extreme and deliberate 
parody of the tragic itself, of the whole, hideous, earthly seriousness and misery from 
the past, of the finally defeated, crudest form of perversion, of the ascetic ideal…it 
would be nice to think so: because what would an intentionally serious Parsifal be 
like? …. A curse on the senses and the mind in one breath of hate? An apostasy and 
return to sickly Christian and obscurantist ideals? (Nietzsche 1994:3/3) 
This, Nietzsche suggests, is indeed the case: late Wagner possesses “a secret desire”  
to “preach a straightforward reversion, conversion, denial, Christianity, medievalism” 
(Nietzsche 1994:3/3).  
The Wagner case illustrates the full range across which Nietzsche understands the 
concept of decadence. First, he presents it in physiological and psychological terms. “Wagner 
est une névrose”: Wagner is a neurosis, whose “art is sick” (Nietzsche 2010c:242). In line 
with this diagnosis, Wagnerian music spreads decadence through “convulsions” and a 
theatrical excess that uses “music to stimulate tired nerves” (Nietzsche 2010c:242). This 
echoes Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the priest in the Genealogy as manipulating an “excess of 
feeling” to simultaneously anesthetize and exhaust his subjects (Nietzsche 1994:3/3). Second, 
decadence is a stylistic phenomenon:  
For the moment, I am only going to look at the question of style. – What is the 
hallmark of all literary decadence?... Life, equal vitality, the vibration and exuberance 
of life pushed back into the smallest structures, all the rest impoverished of life….The 
whole does not live at all any more: it is cobbled together, calculated, synthetic, an 
artefact. (Nietzsche 2010c:245) 
Wagner, as the perfect decadent, was thus the perfect “miniaturist” (Nietzsche 2010c:246). 
Third, decadence is inescapably a political issue. Faced with the “anarchy” of his own 
instincts, Socrates sought to tyrannize them through rationality; resentful of the Athenian 
nobles and conscious of his own ugliness, he sought revenge by dialectic (Nietzsche 
2010d:163). Similarly, Wagner is: 
A typical decadent, who has a sense of necessity in his corrupted taste, who uses it to 
lay claim to a higher taste, who knows how to enforce his corruption as a law, as 
progress, as fulfilment. (Nietzsche 2010c:241) 
Wagnerian decadence for Nietzsche is thus a profound physiological, stylistic and political 
threat: in it, one of the key means to combat decadence, art, has become subordinated to it. 
 Yet whilst Wagner come to exemplify this threat, it is one with important parallels in 
Nietzsche’s own thought. There is a persistent concern in Nietzsche that by beautifying life 
art serves simultaneously as incentive to embrace it and as a way of escaping its realities. 
Crudely put, is it truly affirmation if what one affirms is whitewashed? In the Birth of 
Tragedy, this anxiety is managed by appeal to the supposedly metaphysical insights granted 
by the Dionysiac and preserved within Greek theatre’s fusion of Dionysiac and Apollonian 
moments. Without such a fusion, without the Dionysiac dimension, art itself risk 
degeneration: 
[I]nto an empty, amusing distraction...[Here] music is deprived of its true dignity, 
which consists in being a Dionysiac mirror of the world, so that all that remains to 
music, as the slave of the world of appearances, is to imitate the forms of the world of 
appearances and to excite external pleasure in the play of line and proportion. 
(Nietzsche 1999:93) 
Penultimate Draft - Please Cite the Published Version 
https://kcl.academia.edu/SachaGolob 
9	
	
As I noted, the Schopenhauerian metaphysics of the “Dionysiac mirror” are rapidly 
abandoned by Nietzsche, but the basic problem remains.  
 On the one hand, he wants to applaud art as that in which “lying sanctifies itself and 
the will to deception has good conscience on its side” (Nietzsche 1994:3/25). This illusion is 
vital in a situation where “honesty would lead to nausea and suicide” (Nietzsche 2001:§107). 
As he puts it in a famous note, we thus “possess art less we perish of the truth” (Nietzsche 
1968:§822). On the other hand, however, such “rounding off” of reality is closely linked to its 
denial (Nietzsche 2001:107). 
Perhaps there is even an order of rank for these wounded children, the born artists, 
who find pleasure in life only by intending to falsify its image, in a sort of prolonged 
revenge against life –. We can infer the degree to which life has been spoiled for them 
from the extent to which they want to see its image distorted, diluted, deified, and cast 
into the beyond – considered as artists, the homines religiosi would belong to the 
highest rank. (Nietzsche 2002:53) 
In short, Nietzsche alternately presents art as both the solution to decadence and as just 
another of its guises. It is the former moment which leads him to question whether Wagner 
“was even a musician” as opposed to a mere actor or a physiologist, practising the 
“corruption of the nerves (Nietzsche 2010c:247;257). It is the latter, which leads him to warn 
of “the artists of decadence, who fundamentally have a nihilistic attitude toward life [and] 
take refuge in the beauty of form” (Nietzsche 1968:§852). 
 
(§6) Three Lines of Development 
I have focused on Kant, Pater and Nietzsche because their systematic aesthetics is profoundly 
interlinked with the conceptual development of decadence. I want to close by indicating three 
lines along which the discussion might be extended. 
 The first would be to pressure the notion of the “aesthetic”: what precisely marks an 
“aesthetic” theory in contrast to a philosophy of art more broadly construed? After all, a 
number of 20th century thinkers offer detailed philosophies of art that actively reject the term: 
Heidegger, for example (Heidegger 1981:80-4). This is a deeply complex question and the 
answer will depend on whether one starts from a Kantian or Hegelian conception of 
aesthetics. But one option would be to align aesthetics with a spectatorial approach, an 
emphasis on the viewer, rather than the creator of an artwork. The choice between an 
aesthetics of decadence as opposed to a more broadly decadent philosophy of art might then 
be developed in dialogue with the idea on self-curation, touched on above, that one sees in 
Nietzsche and then in authors such as Wilde.  
 The second option would be to retain the term “aesthetics” and explicitly insert the 
‘decadence problem’ and its history into those 20th century authors where “decadence” is no 
longer a central explanatory category, even if it still carries some of the old rhetorical force. 
Adorno is an obvious candidate: at the very crudest level, “decadence” and “decadent” occur 
only a handful of times in his Aesthetic Theory, less than on many of Nietzsche’s single 
pages. It would be interesting, in particular, to see how the complex social role which Adorno 
allows for autonomous art might ground a resistance to decadence or serve as a site for its 
development and play. 
 The third possibility would be to go back to Kantian aesthetics and to focus on those 
aspects left out of the narrative above, aspects such as the sublime. This played a relatively 
limited role in Kant’s unintentional contributions to 19th century work on decadence. But 
some of the thinkers one could easily align with decadence in the 20th century rely on a 
combination of a “transgressive sublime” and an aggressive rejection of autonomism in 
which art actively fractures or subverts the instrumental or moral world. Bataille would be a 
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natural case to focus on - provided, of course, one preserves the full range of ambiguities in 
both “natural” and in “case”.  
 My aim in this chapter has been to chart the relationship between decadence and 
aesthetics. At its head, lies a Kantian paternity that Kant himself would certainly disavow. 
This Kantian inheritance is at once appropriated and deformed in writers such as Gautier and 
Pater. By the time of Nietzsche, both the philosopher himself and art are deeply implicated in 
decadence's ambiguity: each is simultaneously a product of it and the potential solution to it. 
Finally, as I suggested in closing, "decadence" now marks several lines along which the idea 
of an aesthetics might be further developed or challenged or warped. I began this chapter by 
describing the relationship between decadence and aesthetics as intimate yet conflicted - I 
hope, with this overview in place, that it is now clear why. 
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